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Messenger Matters: European Union Studies outside Europe and Public Diplomacy by 
Proxy 
Yifan YANG 
Abstract: Public diplomacy has gained worldwide acceptance due to its role in engaging 
foreign publics and fostering mutual understanding. However, as an integral part of public 
diplomacy, a message on its own cannot necessarily generate the expected effect among 
target groups. By drawing upon the two-step flow of communication theory, this paper 
discusses the credibility of messengers in public diplomacy and the practical necessity of 
public diplomacy by proxy. Through looking at the Jean Monnet Programme, one of the 
European Union (EU) studies programmes launched by the EU, and its implementation in 
China, the paper aims to develop an understanding of how EU public diplomacy by proxy is 
implemented towards target countries. 
Key words: Two-Step Flow of Communication, Messenger, Public Diplomacy by Proxy, the 
Jean Monnet Programme, European Union, China 
Introduction 
Public diplomacy has gained worldwide acceptance in contemporary international relations, 
due to its important role in engaging foreign publics and fostering mutual understanding. It 
had been in practice long before the current debate on it began,1 but the earliest definition 
of public diplomacy, which emphasizes the influence of public attitudes on the formation and 
execution of foreign policies, was given by Edmund A. Gullion in 1965.2 As the research into 
it has deepened, public diplomacy has also been conceptualized as an indirect process of 
influencing foreign governments and their policies, whether through direct engagement with 
their publics3 or through a government’s strategy of communicating with foreign publics in 
an attempt to understand their government and society.4 
With the increasing participation of non-state actors and the prevalence of internet-based 
communication technologies, Melissen suggests that large and small non-state actors, and 
other supranational and subnational players, also participate in and design their own public 
diplomacy policies that extend beyond the traditional public diplomacy initiated by states.5 
                                                        
1 N. J. Cull, Public Diplomacy before Gullion: the Evolution of a Phrase (USC Public Diplomacy 
Series, 2006):2 
2 Edward Murrow Center, ‘What is Public Diplomacy?’, available at: 
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Murrow/Diplomacy (1965) (Accessed 15 April 2014) 
3 G. Malone, ‘Managing Public Diplomacy’, The Washington Quarterly, 8(3) (1985): 199-213 
4 H. Tuch, Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1990): 3 
5 J. Melissen, ‘The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice’, in J. Melissen (ed.), The 
New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005):3-27 
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This is echoed by Gregory, who defines public diplomacy as ‘an instrument used by states, 
associations of states, and some sub- and non-state actors to advance their interests and 
values’.6 
The EU is no exception. As a supranational organization, the EU is to some degree a model of 
regional integration, and its success regarding regional integration is admired more outside 
the EU than at home.7 However, its international influence is currently under pressure since 
the financial crisis, internal bickering and competing national agendas have had an adverse 
impact on its image abroad.8 Considering that the role of the EU in the world is determined 
by both its internal capacity and its external influence beyond its borders,9 it needs public 
diplomacy in order to inform the world audience about what it does and what it stands for, 
and to enhance the attractiveness of the EU by engaging these foreign publics.10 
The influence of the EU through its message relates to the internal formation of European 
identity and to the external diffusion of its founding norms.11 Some may argue that 
‘speaking with one voice’ is the primary concern of the EU’s public diplomacy, considering 
that its institutional complex may prevent one voice from being heard.12 But, as Litvinsky 
suggests, the rhetoric that the EU lacks one voice does not apply, as it is not a nation state.13 
Rather, a common message does exist. 14  Following this logic, strategic narratives, 15 
representational force, 16  and sociolinguistic construction 17  closely relating to 
                                                        
6 B. Gregory, ‘American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation’, The 
Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 6 (2011):351-372 
7 European Commission, ‘The Future of EU Studies’, background document of the Jean Monnet 
Conference 2014, Brussels, 1-2 October, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/education/events/2014/doc/jm-conference-points-wg4_en.pdf (Accessed 17 April 
2015) 
8 United States National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, NIC report 
(2008):32 
9 C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor (London: Routledge, 2005):2 
10 A. Michalski, ‘The EU as a Soft Power: the Force of Persuasion’, In Jan Melissen (ed.), The New 
Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005):124-146 
11 S.B. Rasmussen, ‘The Messages and Practices of the European Union’s Public Diplomacy’, The 
Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 5 (2010):263-287 
12 T. Vončina, ‘Speaking with One Voice: Statement and Declarations as an Instrument of the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy’, EFA Rev., 16(2) (2011):169-186 
13 M. Litvinsky, European Union Public Diplomacy: The Need for a New Frame, Master’s degree 
thesis, The George Washington University (2010):4 
14 Rasmussen, supra, n. 11 
15 A. Miskimmon, B. O’Loughlin and L. Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the 
New World Order (New York and London: Routledge, 2013):138 
16 J. B. Mattern, ‘Why Soft Power Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic 
Construction of Attraction in World Politics’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 33(3) 
(2005):583-612 
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information-oriented public diplomacy are put forward as factors, which emphasize the 
importance of message in effect public diplomacy. 
Nevertheless, a good message does not necessarily lead to an expected effect. The message 
of the EU, whether it is reflected in information activities or carried by educational and 
cultural programmes, aims to reach its foreign publics through a communication process. 
However, from the perspective of communication effect research, the effectiveness of public 
diplomacy is also affected by the credibility of information sources. 18  Thus, for the 
communicators who cannot reach their audiences directly, the credibility of messenger have 
a determining effect because the wrong messenger will ruin the meanings the message 
carries, no matter how good the message is.19 Since the EU is viewed as a model of regional 
integration and endeavours to promote EU norms, its message is loud and clear. Thus, this 
paper concerns the question of how to ensure that the EU’s message is communicated to its 
end recipients by an appropriate messenger. 
Thanks to the launch of academic programmes to support EU studies outside Europe, those 
scholars and experts who obtain financial support effectively serve as messengers, 
broadcasting the EU’s message to non-EU countries. These experts may have multiple 
functions in their home countries, whether as professors who deliver knowledge about the 
EU to students; commentators in the mass media, who help set the frame and agenda for 
public discussion; as bridges connecting the EU with third countries, who can thereby 
provide feedback to the EU. Given that the Jean Monnet Programme (one of the EU studies 
programmes sponsored by the EU) has been implemented in China for 14 years -- a time 
span long enough to be able to evaluate its effects, in concert with case study as a better way 
to research contemporary events that cannot not be isolated from its social context,20 this 
research takes the implementation of the Jean Monnet Programme in China as a case to 
study EU public diplomacy by proxy and collects the first-hand material by interviewing EU 
official and Chinese professors.  
Due to time and financial constraints, this research used the technique of snow-ball sampling 
– asking the interviewees to recommend other interviewees.21 During four-month fieldwork 
in China and Belgium (December 2013-Feburary 2014, December 2014-February 2015), 
seven EU officials and eleven Chinese professors were interviewed. Although the interview 
                                                                                                                                                              
17 T. Solomon, ‘The Affective Underpinnings of Soft Power’, European Journal of International 
Relations, 20(3) (2014):720-742 
18 C. I. Hovland, and W. Weiss, ‘The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness’, 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 15(4) (1951):635-650 
19 Council on Foreign Relations, Improving the U.S. Public Diplomacy Campaign in the War against 
Terrorism, Task Force Report No. 38 (2001), available at: 
http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/improving-us-public-diplomacy-campaign-war-against-terrorism/p4215, 
(Accessed 02 April 2015) 
20 Yin, R.K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods (2nd edition), (London: Sage):6 
21 Small, M.L., ‘How Many Cases Do I Need? On Science and the Logic of Case Selection in 
Field-Based Research’, Ethnology, 10(1) (2009): 5-38 
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questions were designed long before the interview, the face-to-face interview from one to 
another was not a simple repetition. Based on the previous one, the interview practice was 
in the process of continuous adjustment and re-evaluation, and eventually, each new 
interviewee cannot tell more that the researcher has not heard before regarding specific 
interview questions. Thus, the quantity of the interviewees in the field-based research about 
the effect of the Jean Monnet Programme in China attained saturation. With the empirical 
data, the study can tell us how EU public diplomacy is implemented on the ground, or more 
generally, how important the messenger is in public diplomacy. 
Therefore, the remainder of this paper consists of four sections. The first section provides a 
theoretical framework covering the two-step flow of communication and public diplomacy in 
proxy. The second puts the promotion of EU studies in the context of EU public diplomacy by 
proxy, with the aim of figuring out the connections between the two. Combining this with 
the interviews in China and Belgium, the third and fourth parts will then analyse how to 
communicate the EU in academic programmes from the perspective of EU officials, and how 
the proxy for EU public diplomacy in China works. 
 
1. The Two-Step Flow of Communication and Public Diplomacy by Proxy 
Drawing on the different understandings of public diplomacy mentioned above, this paper 
defines public diplomacy as a cross-border two-way communication process, deployed and 
carried out by different actors who participate in international relations, with the aim of 
projecting a favourable image, influencing foreign perceptions and eventually serving the 
national interests in the long run. Thus, irrespective of specific channels, tools and aims, 
public diplomacy is a communication process, although the audience is located within a 
different cultural context. However, public diplomacy does not always seek its mass audience 
directly, meaning we must consider the two-step flow model in the transnational 
communication context. 
The two-step flow of communication, first formulated in 1944, implies that ideas often flow 
from radio and print to opinion leaders, and from these to less active sections of the 
population,22 emphasizing the effect of interpersonal communication as a channel of 
communication. In this process, opinion leaders are not only information providers but also 
information seekers.23 Accordingly, it is opinion leaders, rather than the mass media, who 
have the most influence on the media audience.24 More importantly, further research has 
                                                        
22 P. F. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson and H. Gaudet, The People’s Choice (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1948):151 
23 E. C. Nisbet, ‘The Engagement Model of Opinion Leadership: Testing Validity Within A European 
Context’, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 18(1) (2005):3-30 
24 E. A .Yepsen, Practicing Successful Twitter Public Diplomacy: A model and case study of U.S. 
efforts in Venezuela, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy Paper 6, University of Southern California 
(2012):13 
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proven that opinion leaders and the people they influence are very much alike, and typically 
belong to the same primary groups.25 Although the two-step flow model is based on the 
study of interpersonal communication occurring within one country, its application to public 
diplomacy – a transnational communication practice – can offer different insights into the 
practice of public diplomacy. 
Since public diplomacy is a form of cross-border communication, finding an appropriate 
messenger (i.e., an opinion leader influential with the target groups) can solve three 
problems. First, public diplomacy requires credibility, but official information channels always 
lack credibility.26 Therefore, a credible proxy who can speak on behalf of the implementers 
of public diplomacy will be helpful in sharing the total burden shouldered by the 
implementers, and increasing the effect of public diplomacy.27 Second, public diplomacy is a 
form of transnational and sometimes even transcultural communication, meaning that its 
message not only needs to reach the target audience but it also needs to make sense to 
them. Messengers in similar cultures or the same countries as the audience can explain the 
message to them while speaking for the implementer of public diplomacy. Third, high 
visibility does not necessarily lead to a favourable image.28 A messenger communicating the 
information on behalf of the implementer can help lower the visibility of the implementer 
behind the public diplomacy message. This paper will not address this point further, but 
Manheim’s findings remain persuasive. 
It is worth noting that scholarly discussion has already begun to apply the two-step flow 
model to public diplomacy. The relationship between social media users and their followers 
in information sharing is comparable to that of opinion leaders and the people influenced in 
this model, which explains why social media – with its characteristics of interpersonal 
communication – is utilized to conduct public diplomacy in target countries.29 Based on the 
two-step flow model, experienced public diplomacy officers know fully well that a credible 
human factor is important in effective communication, meaning that a message transmitted 
by the mass media is far more credible but would have a greater impact if it were relayed to 
audiences by key opinion leaders.30 British public diplomacy also puts emphasis on elites, 
who then mediate and multiply the message in order to reach the wider masses, which is in 
                                                        
25 E. Katz, ‘The Two–Step Flow of Communication: An Up-To-Date Report on an Hypothesis’, 
Political Opinion Quarterly, 21(1) (1957):61-78 
26 H. Jungermann, H.-R. Pfister and K. Fischer, ‘Credibility, Information Preference, and Information 
Interests’, Risk Analysis, 16(2) (1996):251-261 
27 Council on Foreign Relations, Improving the U.S. Public Diplomacy Campaign in the War against 
Terrorism, Task Force Report No. 38 (2001), available at: 
http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/improving-us-public-diplomacy-campaign-war-against-terrorism/p4215, 
(Accessed 02 April 2015) 
28 J. B. Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of 
Influence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994):126-147 
29 Yepsen, supra, n 24 
30 W. A. Rugh, Front Line Public Diplomacy: How US Embassies Communicate with Foreign Publics 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014):73 
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line with the two-step flow.31 Indeed, applying the two-step flow model to public diplomacy 
not only solves the credibility problems but also addresses certain ethical concerns.32 These 
studies point out the similarity between the two-step flow model and public diplomacy as a 
cross-border communication process, and the necessity of looking for a credible message, 
yet they do not concentrate on it as an independent phenomenon of public diplomacy 
practice. 
While researching EU public diplomacy practices, Rasmussen suggests that supporting civil 
society activities in target countries can help the EU deliver its message through civil society 
actors, because of the credibility of the latter; this is called ‘public diplomacy by proxy’.33 
However, Winston Churchill, former Prime Minister of the UK, was already embracing public 
diplomacy by proxy when seeking aid from the US during the Second World War, in that, 
according to Churchill, it was helpful to use America’s own voices – particularly those of 
journalists and reporters with good reputation – to convince the US public that it was in the 
best interests of the US to aid Britain.34 Both these cases locate the proxies for public 
diplomacy inside the target countries. 
The proxy for public diplomacy can also be outside the target countries. Through studying 
the competition for diplomatic recognition between the People’s Republic of China (P.R. 
China) and Taiwan in Central America, Alexander noticed that certain poor countries 
switched their diplomatic relations from Taiwan to Beijing, because of the promise of huge 
investment. This made other poor Central American republics diplomatically salivate, after 
witnessing the special treatment offered by Beijing, and many followed suit in establishing 
diplomatic relations with P.R. China. 35  Thus, public diplomacy by proxy can also be 
understood as the performance of public diplomacy within one nation state, with the 
intention of creating favourable opinion among the public and elites of another nation 
state.36 
In the cases above, it is clear that there are two different kinds of proxies in public diplomacy. 
In the former case, civil society actors originating from the target countries can serve as 
internal proxies for EU public diplomacy, which highlights the influence of civil society actors 
                                                        
31 J. Pamment, New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study of Policy and 
Practice (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013):75 
32 E. Sevin, ‘Thinking about Place Branding: Ethics of Concept’, Place Branding and Public 
Diplomacy, 7 (2011):155-164 
33 Rasmussen, supra, n. 11 
34 P. Seib, Real-time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in the Social Media Era (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012):116 
35 C. Alexander, China, Costa Rica, and the Race for U.N. Security General, Centre on Public 
Diplomacy, University of South California (2011), available at: 
http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/china_costa_rica_and_the_race_for_un_secretary_general. 
(Accessed 02 April 2015) 
36 C. Alexander, ‘Public Diplomacy and the Diplomatic Truce: Taiwan and the People’s Republic of 
China in EI Salvador’, Public diplomacy and Place Branding, 7(4) (2011):271-288 
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within their home countries. In the latter case, the proxy for China’s public diplomacy 
towards the other Central American countries is a nation state acting as external proxy, 
paying attention to the attractiveness of successful models. Yet, in a way, talking about public 
diplomacy by proxy, from its very outset, involves looking for solutions to the credibility 
problems. In other words, effective public diplomacy requires credibility, yet the most 
credible voice is not always one’s own.37 
In this way, public diplomacy by proxy, as a phenomenon in practice, involves the indirect 
engagement with foreign publics through employing messengers – either inside or outside 
the target countries – on behalf of the implementers, so as to enhance the credibility of the 
message and improve the effect of public diplomacy. Under these circumstances, public 
diplomacy can be broken down into two steps: the message first travels from the original 
implementer of public diplomacy to the proxy (messenger), and then it travels from the 
proxy to its end recipient (foreign publics). 
 
2. EU Studies outside Europe and EU Public Diplomacy by Proxy 
The remit of EU studies is broad, and includes the contemporary characters of the EU and 
the pre-1993 European Community, as well as the long view on the European integration 
process.38 EU studies is preferred here because the academic programmes promoted by the 
EU to third parties always have the specific objective of promoting EU studies at this current 
stage. In some ways, EU studies is just another interdisciplinary research area, yet the EU’s 
work in promoting EU studies outside of Europe can be viewed as EU public diplomacy. 
Interestingly, the responsibility for promoting EU studies around the world is shouldered by a 
number of different Directorates-General (DGs) within the European Commission: the DG for 
International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) has delivered EU studies 
programmes to developing countries within the framework of development aid;39 the 
Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) has launched the EU Centres Programme, as well 
as the European Union Academic Programme in Hong Kong and Macao; and the DG for 
Education and Culture (DG EAC) is responsible for the Jean Monnet Programme.40 As of now, 
both the EU Centres Programme and the Jean Monnet Programme are still in effect. 
The EU Centres Programme, under the theme of cooperation between industrialized 
countries, is one of the academic programmes that promote EU studies outside Europe. 
                                                        
37 N. J. Cull, ‘Public Diplomacy: Seven Lessons for its Future from its Past’, Place Branding and 
Public Diplomacy, 6 (2010):11-17 
38 A. K. Bourne and M. Cini, ‘Introduction: defining boundaries and identifying trends in European 
Union studies’, in M. Cini, and A. K. Bourne (eds.), Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies, 
(Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006):3 
39 Interview in Beijing, China, 11 December 2013 
40 Interview in Brussels, Belgium, 06 February 2015 
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Within the FPI, public diplomacy towards industrialized countries is implemented by 
supporting EU Centres, public policy think tanks and research institutes purporting to 
increase the visibility and enhance the positive image of the EU. To this end, EU Centres were 
established within universities in the target countries or areas (Australia, Canada, USA, Russia, 
New Zealand, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau) in order to 
promote EU studies, increase knowledge of the EU among foreign students, establish a 
network for information and education activities, and raise awareness of the EU among 
foreign publics.41 Because of the budget, only eight countries and three areas are currently 
covered by this programme.42 
The Jean Monnet Programme is not, strictly speaking, a public diplomacy programme, yet it 
does serve the function of public diplomacy in practice.43 It was originally launched in 1989 
within the EU, and promoted to countries outside the EU in 2001, which involved the 
creation of Jean Monnet Chairs, Centres of Excellence, Modules, information and research 
activities, and support for academic associations of professors and researchers to research 
European integration. According to official EC data, as of 2014, this programme has covered 
77 countries, helping to establish 165 Jean Monnet Centres of Excellence, 879 Jean Monnet 
Chairs, and 2,139 permanent courses and Jean Monnet Modules between 1990 and 2011.44  
In spite of their shared objectives in promoting EU studies, these two programmes were 
launched and conducted by different institutions in keeping with their respective 
capabilities.45 Interestingly, according to Vito Borrelli, Head of Sector, Jean Monnet and 
China Desk, the Jean Monnet Programme will eventually incorporate the EU Centres 
Programme, due to its success, meaning that the EU Centres will become Jean Monnet 
Centres sometime in the coming years.46 Thus, the implementation of the Jean Monnet 
Programme will be studied as a case of EU public diplomacy by proxy. Besides, this 
programme is under-researched, although scholars have previous called for research into 
how identity creation and ideology transfer are at work within the context of EU studies 
centres and Jean Monnet Chairs.47  
                                                        
41 EU Centres, available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/eu-centres/index_en.htm (Accessed 10 April 
2014) 
42 Conversation with Dr. Jolita Pons, Desk officer for China, Hong Kong and Macau of the EEAS, in 
the roundtable discussion affiliated with the ECRAN annual conference in Brussels, 17 June 2014 
43 O. Quintin, ‘Speech in the closing session of the conference of 20 Years of Support for European 
Integration Studies’, in European Union (ed.), 20 Years of Support for European Integration Studies: 
From the Jean Monnet Action to the Jean Monnet Programme, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the 
European Union (2011):327-332 
44 Education, Audiovisual and Cultural Executive Agency (EACEA), Information about the Jean 
Monnet Programme from 2007-2013 (2014), available at: 
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/llp/jean_monnet/jean_monnet_en.php (Accessed 29 September 2014) 
45 Interview in Brussels, Belgium, 06 February 2015 
46 Interview in Brussels, Belgium, 05 February 2015 
47 G. Wiessala, ‘Social-Cultural and Educational Cooperation between the EU and Asia’, in 
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Before 2014, the main aim of the Jean Monnet Programme was to increase knowledge of 
European integration, by promoting teaching, research and debate on every aspect of the EU 
and its relations with the world, and thus stimulate knowledge exchange among 
professionals.48 After being integrated into the new ‘Erasmus Plus’ programme in 2014, the 
aim of the Jean Monnet Programme has been specified as innovation (studying the EU from 
new angles and through new methodologies), cross-fertilisation (boosting the knowledge of 
the EU) and knowledge dissemination of the EU, making this programme more inclusive.49 
Thus, the Jean Monnet Programme does have a public diplomacy function, with its specific 
aim of disseminating knowledge about European integration by promoting teaching, 
research and debate on the history, politics, economics and law of the EU, and the EU’s 
relations with the rest of the world.50  
More importantly, it holds comparative advantages when explaining the EU to the whole 
world. In practice, those professors who perform their research with the support of the Jean 
Monnet Programme in their own countries become proxies for EU public diplomacy. 
According to the discussion relating to the two-step flow model in a transnational 
communication context, the Jean Monnet Programme also possesses certain advantages in 
explaining the EU to college students and to the general public.  
First, university professors always possess high credibility as an information source.51 
Although the eligibility of applicants has not been verified, the centre director at Sichuan 
University regarded previous research results and interest in the EU as prerequisites for 
obtaining funding, so these professors are bound to both know a great deal about and have a 
clear research preference for the EU. Such scholars and experts then inform students about 
the EU’s work, as well as the broader public through media interviews.52  
Besides this, the credibility of the Jean Monnet Programme is based on its independence 
from the political sphere. Di Fonzo, who has worked in this programme for almost 20 years, 
has stated that the original creators of the Jean Monnet Programme tried to design a pure 
academic programme and kept it separate from any political influence back then, which has 
                                                                                                                                                              
Christiansen, T. Kirchner, E. and Murray, P. B. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2013):221-225 
48 EACEA, Short Presentation of the Jean Monnet Programme in 10 Points (2012), available at: 
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/llp/jean_monnet/documents/jm_in_10_points_webupdate_may2012_en.pdf, 
(Accessed 18 April 2015) 
49 EACEA, Erasmus Plus Programme Guide (2014), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/documents/erasmus-plus-programme-guide_en.pdf, 
(Accessed 14 March 2015) 
50 Ibid. 
51 Jungermann, supra, n 26 
52 European Commission, Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, Establishing 
‘Erasmus for All’, the Union programme for Education, Training, Youth and Sport, COM (2011) 788 
Final, Brussels, 23rd Nov. (2011): 21 
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constituted one of the most significant features of this programme.53  
Second, the Jean Monnet Programme is able to cross cultural barriers and make the EU’s 
message more acceptable, because the professors sponsored by this programme who serve 
as the proxies for EU public diplomacy already display a preference towards the EU, whilst 
retaining a discursive power in their target countries based on their academic reputation.54 
This goes to prove that public diplomacy is, by its nature, an activity of spanning borders that 
exist both physically and psychologically.55 As mentioned before, the two-step flow of 
communication theory takes effect because the opinion leaders and the people they 
influence belong to the same primary group.56 Therefore, these professors are not only able 
to deliver accurate knowledge of the EU to college students, but they also have the power to 
influence these students’ knowledge learning and perception formation, based on the 
interpersonal communication between these two highly similar groups: professors and 
college students. 
Third, since the Jean Monnet Programme communicates the EU’s message to college 
students by supporting academic research on the EU, it is able to achieve a greater level of 
output with less input. By supporting academic research, the programme is able to influence 
and inform a significant number of those teachers’ students, many of whom will be from 
overseas, thus further broadening the Jean Monnet Programme’s reach. 
Whether we look at EU studies programmes in general, or study the Jean Monnet 
Programme in particular, it is clear that the support offered to foreign professors to research 
the EU and to teach college students in their home countries reflects the ways in which the 
EU’s public diplomacy by proxy has been implemented in practice. In the following two 
sections, empirical data collected from interviews with EU officials and Chinese professors 
participated in the Jean Monnet Programme will be analysed. 
 
3. EU Officials: Bringing the European Project to Chinese Publics 
The actors of EU public diplomacy in China include the Delegation of the EU to China, the 
EU’s own online posts through their official social media account, and the cultural and 
educational branches of its member states. The Delegation is viewed as providing credible 
resources to the Chinese media57, but, following the rules of the media, attractive news 
stories still tend to be favoured over accurate information. While social media provides a 
                                                        
53 Interview in Brussels, Belgium, 17 February 2015 
54 Interview in Chengdu, Sichuan, China, 17 December 2013 
55 A. Fisher, (2013), Collaborative Public Diplomacy: how transnational networks influenced 
American studies in Europe, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2013): 10 
56 Katz, supra, n.25 
57 N. Chaban, S. Kelly, and J. Bain, ‘European Commission Delegations and EU Public Policy: 
Stakeholders’ Perception from the Asia-Pacific’, EFA Rev, 14(2) (2009):271-288 
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platform for the EU to engage with the Chinese public directly, they rarely respond to 
questions raised by Chinese followers.58 Besides, the agendas of the individual branches of 
member states might compete with that of the EU when it comes to public diplomacy. Thus, 
the Jean Monnet Programme may offer a way out. 
At the very beginning, the Jean Monnet Programme was designed to shrink the gap between 
the elites’ and citizens’ perceptions of European integration. Indeed, when the Declaration of 
European Identity was released in 1973, a consensus had been reached among the visionary 
leaders of the EU concerning the need to bring the European project closer to the man in the 
street.59 Finally, the first decisions of the Jean Monnet Action (the predecessor of the Jean 
Monnet Programme) were made in 1990, after a series of meetings and procedures.60 Up 
until 1998, the Jean Monnet Action sponsored over 500 professors, who led at least 1,400 
seminars within the EU member states, in which around 251,000 students participated.61 On 
top of this, over 1,200 PhD students’ theses were written under the supervision of the Jean 
Monnet Professors.62  
Despite the fact that it was originally designed for EU citizens, the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland were also included in this programme before they officially joined the EU 
family,63 which provided a prelude for the EU’s extension of this programme to non-EU 
states outside Europe though China and those candidate countries that eventually became 
member states of the EU were qualitatively different. However, extending the target 
countries of the Jean Monnet Programme required certain procedural issues to be addressed. 
On the one hand, the successful experience of implementing the Jean Monnet Programme 
within EU member states and candidate countries led to the programme managers who were 
in office at that time considering promoting this successful experience to non-EU member 
states. On the other hand, it required a new budget plan and the relevant decisions from the 
Parliament. By 2001, a new budget for an extended Jean Monnet Programme with an 
enlarged target group had been proposed and was eventually approved.64 Some officials 
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also stated that the EU’s global strategy, which was released around 2001, also required the 
EU to start communicating its message to the outside world, which could have resulted in the 
promotion of the Jean Monnet Programme outside Europe.65 With 25 years of practice, the 
increasing number of target countries and the scale of the sponsored projects manifest the 
vitality of the programme in promoting EU studies outside Europe. 
The Jean Monnet Programme has also made adjustment in order to adapt to developments 
within the EU and to the requirements of external applicants. Because of its success, the Jean 
Monnet Action became the Jean Monnet Programme, with the same status as other EU 
educational programme, in 2007.66 After being integrated into the Erasmus Plus, its aims 
changed slightly from supporting ‘European integration studies’ to supporting ‘EU studies’, 
making this programme more inclusive. According to Girelli, a programme manager for the 
Jean Monnet Programme, European integration studies placed more emphasis on the EU 
member states and its candidate countries, while EU studies pays more attention to the 
relations between the EU and non-EU states.67 Borrelli added that the former focused on 
political and economic aspects of integration, while the latter extends to other aspects, such 
as culture and identity. In addition, the limits stipulating that a Jean Monnet Chair holder 
cannot be granted this award twice were removed, which has meant professors can receive 
funding from the EU continuously, to help them carry out their research.68 In this sense, it 
seems that the Jean Monnet Programme also has a feedback mechanism in place that allows 
for the EU to redirect the programme towards whatever interests its audience. 
Based on the selection criteria of the Jean Monnet Action, a Jean Monnet Chair has to 
deliver at least 90 hours of teaching per semester and each Jean Monnet Module lasts at 
least 40 hours per semester. Put differently, both the Jean Monnet Chairs and Jean Monnet 
Modules are closely related to knowledge delivery in the classroom. Besides, the Jean 
Monnet Programme also supports scholarly exchange by establishing multilateral research 
groups among universities in different countries and holding international conferences in 
Jean Monnet Centres, which promote information dissemination and knowledge exchange. 
Thus, some scholars have also argued that the EU allocates considerable financial resources 
to the Jean Monnet Programme in order to achieve two goals: to increase the attractiveness 
of the EU for scholarly study and to provide a more accurate image of the EU.69 
A recent online survey, conducted by the European Commission’s Jean Monnet team, 
seemed not to be a scientific study but did get some conclusions about the general 
acceptance of this programme with a number of 927 respondents. Response to the survey on 
‘EU studies’ shows an overall satisfaction with the EU studies courses, the teachers, the 
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teaching methods, and in particularly with the Jean Monnet Chair holder professors.70 In 
fact, as an EU studies programme implemented by the EU, it has a special role in EU public 
diplomacy. As mentioned by the EU officials, EU member states have a number of language 
education branches in different countries, and there is a system of cooperation between the 
EU and those branches, with the purpose of communicating the EU’s message and culture.71 
However, because of the diversity of the EU, it is hard to say which one is better to tell the 
EU’s story in China on behalf of the EU.72 In this sense, extending the Jean Monnet 
Programme to China can let the EU’s voice be heard by Chinese public.  
If the analysis above only identifies the general output of the Jean Monnet Programme, its 
implementation in China should also be seen as a great achievement. China is by far the 
most active Asian country in the field of EU studies in the context of the Jean Monnet 
Programme. Under the 2014 call for proposals, five projects were selected from a total of 
seven applications submitted, representing a 71% success rate in the current selection year 
and continuing a trend established over recent years (applications selected between 
2008-2013 totalled 21 out of 41 submitted). Since 2001, 11 Jean Monnet Modules, 15 Jean 
Monnet Chairs, two ‘Ad Personam’ Jean Monnet Chairs, three Jean Monnet Centres, two 
Activities in support of national networks, one multilateral research group and one Jean 
Monnet Project have been awarded to Chinese applicants.73 Considering that the Chinese 
perception of the EU is shaped by EU-China relations and the teaching of the EU in China74 
and Chinese professors specialising in EU studies mainly display a preference towards the 
EU,75 promoting EU studies in China with the necessary financial support is beneficial to the 
EU and increases its influence. On top of this, as one of the Jean Monnet Programme new 
actions in the Erasmus Plus, a Jean Monnet Project was awarded to Sichuan University, which 
aimed to support professors in training teachers from primary and secondary schools in the 
subject of the EU, so that these trained teachers can in turn teach their students.76 Thus, it 
seems that this programme has extended its influence to teenagers beyond college students. 
Admittedly, the Jean Monnet Programme does not only target China; however, interviewing 
relevant EU officials has helped us to understand the selection criteria, historical 
development and certain new changes within this programme, and its connection with EU 
public diplomacy by proxy. 
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4. Chinese Professors: Telling the EU’s Story in China 
The development of EU studies in China stems from the overlapping interests between the 
EU and China. The development of Chinese European studies can be partially attributes to 
the deepening of EU-China relations, but the starting point of Chinese European studies 
concerns the lessons that can be learned from European experiences, in order to inform 
China’s development. 
As Song has indicated, China encountered political, social and economic problems after 30 
years of reform and opening up, and Chinese scholars started introducing the Nordic model, 
especially the Swedish model regarding the ruling position of Social Democratic Party and its 
social security system, to China from the 1980s. However, these trends stopped in the late 
1980s, due to internal political reasons in China.77 However, since the 1960s, Chinese 
scholars and governmental officials have tried to draw lessons from the European experience 
of regional policy and aimed to look for effective solutions to economic disparity between 
different regions in China. In addition, Chinese scholars have studied other aspects of the EU, 
including the EU’s foreign policy and external relations, its approaches to dealing with 
neighbouring countries, its multilateralist approaches to dealing with global and regional 
security, and the example of its peaceful institution and its functionalism, as a route to East 
Asia regional integration.78 
The Jean Monnet Programme was designed to target EU member states and then to extend 
to non-EU states after 10 years of its implementation. It is obvious that China is not the only 
target country covered by this programme, but it does promote the EU studies in China from 
the perspective of Chinese professors. In order to understand the implementation of the 
Jean Monnet Programme in China, 11 professors were interviewed from December 2013 to 
February 2014, and from December 2014 to January 2015. Of the 11 professors interviewed, 
two held ‘Ad Personam’ Jean Monnet Chairs, three held Jean Monnet Chairs, three were 
Directors (one from each centre, one of whom was also a Jean Monnet Chair), one was a 
professor who taught a Jean Monnet Module, and three were assistant professors.  
As a vital source of funding, the Jean Monnet Programme supports EU studies in China. As 
mentioned above, the teaching of EU experiences is largely based on China’s internal 
demand, but the EU’s financial support also promotes the flourishing of EU studies in China. 
It is worth noting that, for geopolitical reasons, it is not as easy as to obtain financial support 
from the Chinese government for European studies as it is for Japanese or American 
studies.79 This was echoed by William Fingleton, the press officer of the Delegation of the 
EU to China, when he stated that China-US relations are considered ‘urgent’ while China-EU 
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relations are only considered ‘important’ in diplomatic documents,80 so China will therefore 
invest more into research on the former. For this reason, supporting Chinese professors to 
teach more courses on European studies is helpful for college students wanting to learn 
about and understand the EU and its role in the world. 
For now, the Jean Monnet Programme exists to supports foreign experts, including Chinese 
professors, to conduct research on the EU in Mainland China. Since these new changes to the 
Jean Monnet Programme – such as the cancellation of the limits on second-time applications 
for the Jean Monnet Chairs and increased activities with a bigger budget – have all benefitted 
the researchers, one director in China said that it increased the faith of Chinese scholars in 
conducting EU-related research, because they do not need to worry about funding.81 
However, one professor also pointed out that the programme only covered a small group of 
universities in China, in comparison with two other educational programmes, making its 
impact limited.82 
In practice, the Jean Monnet Programme helps the dissemination of information about the 
EU in China. Eight of the professors who were interviewed taught at least two courses to 
undergraduate and postgraduate students: these courses include European integration; 
European economic integration; European development policy and regional policy; European 
social policy and its welfare system; and European cultures and European identity. They also 
delivered lectures to local party schools and other universities, both in China and overseas. 
One assistant professor taught undergraduate majors and minors in international relations 
focusing on European integration. As one professor mentioned, with the extra financial 
support, he was able to strengthen the knowledge of students by hiring research students for 
document collection, and inviting experts from relevant areas to give lectures.83  
Albeit no specific statistics about how many students participated in the relevant modules, 
the online introduction of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at Renmin University of 
China shows that 24 undergraduate, 35 postgraduate and 18 PhD students in EU studies 
were trained in 2012.84 An assistant professor organized and taught part of a course on 
European studies to around 100 students, all of whom had no prior background in 
international or European studies, and he insisted that classroom teaching definitely helped 
these students get to know the EU. A Jean Monnet Module leader said around 40 
postgraduate students registered his course every semester.85 Considering that 10 Chinese 
universities are covered by the Jean Monnet Programme and the well-trained PhD students 
in these universities will take academic positions and teach in other universities,86 the 
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quantity of Chinese college students directly or indirectly involved in this programme is huge. 
Based on the professors’ evaluation of the effects of EU studies on Chinese students, all the 
interviewees insisted that the students’ knowledge had increased after attending the 
relevant courses. Two professors and two assistant professors considered their students to 
have developed a good impression of the EU as a result. One assistant professor gave 
lectures to students who were minoring in international relations, and, according to those 
professors who were teaching students majoring in other disciplines rather than 
international studies, the classroom teaching was the main channel for those students to 
obtain an accurate knowledge about the EU in order to finish their assignment and exams. 
The other assistant professor organized and taught a selective course to students who had no 
background of international studies, and he thought that this course helped those students 
from programmes such as physics, chemistry and engineering to broaden their horizons. 
After all, besides attending lectures and seminars, students from majors relating to 
international relations may actively seek out more information about the EU, outside of their 
own academic interests. One professor regarded Chinese students’ perceptions of the EU to 
be far deeper than European students’ perceptions of China, and suggested that both the 
Chinese students’ and the public’s interest in the EU had been improving in recent years, as 
reflected by the increasing share of news reports about the EU and EU-China relations.87  
Beyond classroom teaching, the influence of Chinese professors sponsored by the Jean 
Monnet Programme extends to policy-making procedure, and reaches the Chinese publics 
through the mass media. In terms of their impact on policy-making procedure, one professor 
had attended government conferences in order to counsel on policy, while another had 
conducted research and given advice to the government at provincial level, regarding trade 
with the EU. One director revealed that she had submitted reports on international 
conferences to her university, as well as giving policy advice on current EU issues to related 
government departments. However, it is hard to accurately evaluate their impact due to the 
opaqueness of policy making process in China. All eleven of the professor interviewees in 
China stated that they had either been interviewed or asked to write commentaries on the 
subject of the European debt crisis, EU-China relations, European integration, and EU policy 
on China, by a great number of newspapers, magazines and news portals. Two of them had 
also been invited to comment on issues relating to the EU in live broadcasts. Because the 
coverage of the EU in Chinese media is also influenced by marketization of mass media and 
EU-China relations,88 professional comments at least provides an alternative information 
source for Chinese public to understand the EU. 
Hence, the data presented in this section about the interviews with Chinese professors, in 
concert with the analysis regarding Chinese European studies, has answered one of the 
research questions raised in this paper: how does public diplomacy by proxy work through 
the Jean Monnet Programme in China? 
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Conclusion 
Public diplomacy matters greatly for each of the actors on the world stage, and the EU is no 
exception. As a supranational organisation, the EU needs good public diplomacy to 
communicate its message – providing a model of regional integration and a normative power 
– to a global audience. However, a clear message from the EU does not necessarily lead to 
expected effect. By drawing upon the two-step flow of communication model, it can be 
inferred that EU public diplomacy requires a credible messenger on behalf of the EU to speak 
to the target country. 
This paper has focused on the Jean Monnet Programme, one of the EU studies programmes 
promoted by the EU, and identified that the professors sponsored by this programme serve 
as the proxy for EU public diplomacy, and help the message of the EU to be communicated. 
Through interviewing EU officials participating in the implementation of the Jean Monnet 
Programme, and Chinese professors supported by this programme, it can be shown that the 
EU studies programmes, by supporting Chinese professors to conduct research on the EU and 
to teach college students, can enhance the credibility of EU public diplomacy and cross the 
cultural barriers which exist between the EU and China. 
Again, emphasizing the influence of the messenger does not rule out the importance of 
message in public diplomacy. Instead, it offers a new perceptive to study the effect of public 
diplomacy in general and the EU’s practice in particular. As one of the first few attempts to 
consider the Jean Monnet Programme within the theoretical framework of public diplomacy 
by proxy, this paper addresses how EU public diplomacy by proxy is conducted on the ground, 
through launching EU studies programmes and possessing comparative advantages in the 
toolbox of EU public diplomacy. However, since public diplomacy aims to influence the 
perceptions of a foreign audience, the influence of the Jean Monnet Programme on college 
students – based on empirical data collected from the students attending the relevant 
modules – could be used to examine its effect, which merits further study. 
